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INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, public acceptance and understanding of
1
mental retardation has grown. Society presently accepts people with
disabilities and emphasizes community-based programs that provide
2
the disabled with education and support services. In the past,
however, stereotyping, discrimination, and mistreatment of the
mentally retarded was so horrific that the United States Supreme
3
Court described it as “grotesque.” The public believed that mental
retardation was the “principle source of criminal and immoral
4
Consequently, to protect society, the
behavior in society.”
government forced the institutionalization and sterilization of many
5
people with mental retardation.
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1
V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded from the Death
Penalty: A Comment on Florida’s Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 459-60
(1991).
2
Seguin Services, History of Disability Services in the United States, at
http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/3594/history.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) (on
file with author) [hereinafter History of Disability Services].
3
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985).
4
Cohen, supra note 1, at 459. The “Jukes Study,” conducted by Robert Dugdale,
linked degenerate behavior by members of the Jukes family to an inherited mental
deficiency. History of Disability Services, supra note 2. This study, in connection with
increasing public awareness of genetics, contributed to the popular view linking
“idiocy, pauperism, insanity, and crime” to genetics. Id.
5
Cohen, supra note 1, at 459-60. Protection of society included the idea of
protecting the gene pool. History of Disability Services, supra note 2. Consequently, by
1926 there were mandatory sterilization laws in twenty-three states, and between 1925
and 1955 the government forced over 50,000 mentally retarded individuals to
undergo sterilization. Id. In an infamous 1926 decision, the Supreme Court upheld
the forced sterilization of a retarded woman stating:
[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory
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In the 1950s, society began to realize that there was no link
between mental retardation and criminality and attitudes towards
6
mental retardation started to change. During the next two decades,
a government panel on mental retardation focused the public’s
7
attention on the mentally retarded and their unique needs. Parent
organizations also demanded that their children be educated in the
8
same schools as non-disabled children. Finally, in 1977, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled
that, once institutionalized by the state, the mentally retarded have “a
constitutional right to be provided with minimally adequate
habilitation under the least restrictive conditions consistent with the
9
purpose of the commitment.” Following this landmark decision, a
large deinstitutionalization movement across the country led to the
development of home and community-based services with a focus on
self-determination and individualized support in the least restrictive
10
environment.
Simultaneously, the use of the death penalty evolved to limit the
sentence of capital punishment to those murders society views as
11
particularly heinous. A dramatic reduction occurred in the number
12
and types of crimes punishable by death. From colonial times until
the nineteenth century, most states automatically imposed the death
13
penalty for all homicides and for many felonies.
During the

vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
6
Cohen, supra note 1, at 460.
7
Id.
8
History of Disability Services, supra note 2.
9
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa.
1977). The court in Halderman found that the United States Constitution required
that state institutions provide “such minimally adequate habilitation as will afford a
reasonable opportunity for them to acquire and maintain such life skills as are
necessary to enable them to cope as effectively as their capacities permit.” Id. at
1325. The court noted that “involuntarily committed retarded children have a
constitutional right ‘to a program of treatment that affords the individual a
reasonable chance to acquire and maintain those life skills that enable him to cope
as effectively as his own capacities permit with the demands of his own person and of
his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental and social efficiency.’”
Id. at 1317 (citing Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)). The
court ordered immediate steps be taken to move the residents from Pennhurst to
community facilities that could provide minimally adequate habilitation. Id. at 1325.
10
History of Disability Services, supra note 2.
11
Mark Costanzo & Lawrence T. White, Overview of Death Penalty and Capital
Trials, 50 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 1, 4-5 (1994).
12
JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 509 (4th ed. 2000).
13
Id.
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nineteenth century, states gradually began restricting the death
penalty to first-degree murders, and eventually began allowing the
14
judge or jury to decide when to impose a death sentence.
For a brief period of time during the 1970s, the Supreme Court
held that the then existing death penalty schemes were
15
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the death
16
penalty, but has repeatedly increased the constitutional limitations
on imposing it. The Supreme Court, for example, indicated that it
would find unconstitutional death sentences for crimes other than
17
murder. Moreover, the Court also banned the execution of the
18
mentally ill and the execution of those under the age of sixteen at
19
the time the crime was committed.
20
In Atkins v. Virginia, the trend toward public understanding and
acceptance of the mentally retarded and the movement to limit the
14

Id. at 510. First-degree murder is defined as “murder that is willful, deliberate,
or premeditated, or that is committed during the course of another serious felony.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (7th ed. 1999).
15
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court placed a moratorium on the
death penalty, finding that then existing state systems for imposing the death penalty
were arbitrary and capricious. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). Following Furman, most
states enacted new laws to ensure fair and rational imposition of death sentences. See
KAPLAN, supra note 12, at 512-15. These new state laws followed a scheme of “guided
discretion” during the penalty phase that required the trier of fact to weigh certain
aggravating factors against any mitigating factors. Id.
16
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme Court
examined the new “guided discretion” schemes and concluded that these statutes
solved the problems identified in Furman. Id. The death penalty was restored, and in
1976 Gary Gilmore became the first person to be executed under the new death
penalty statutes. MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART xi (1993).
17
See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (holding that the death
penalty is excessive punishment for an offender who had not taken, attempted to
take, or intended to take a life); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977)
(holding that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape is
unconstitutional).
18
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally ill).
19
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In Thompson, a plurality
consisting of Justices Steven, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun found that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of individuals who were under the age
of sixteen at the time the crime was committed. Id. at 838. Justice O’Connor
concurred in the decision. Id. at 848 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor
felt that although it was likely that there was a national consensus forbidding the
execution of offenders whose crimes were committed before the age of sixteen, the
evidence before the Court was not sufficient to establish such a consensus. Id. at 855
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Instead, Justice O’Connor felt that the present statute
was unconstitutional because the failure of the legislation to adopt a minimum age
did not show the special care and deliberation required under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 858-59 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
20
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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use of the death penalty converged. On September 25, 2001, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether the execution
21
of the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment. Applying
22
the “evolving standards of decency test,” the Court considered the
significant number of states that have banned the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and opinion poll results before concluding that the
execution of the mentally retarded constitutes “cruel and unusual
23
punishment.” The Court, however, chose not to adopt a uniform
24
definition of mental retardation. Instead, the Court left the task of
25
defining mental retardation to the states.
Currently, numerous statutory and organizational definitions for
26
mental retardation exist. Although most definitions have similar
features, variability among statutory definitions is so great that it can
result in one state classifying a defendant as mentally retarded while
27
others do not.
Further, while the use of valid and reliable
psychological testing measures is a central feature of the professional
organizational definitions of mental retardation, few statutory
definitions mandate the use of these readily available testing
28
methods. To avoid variability among the states and to ensure the
proper identification of mentally retarded defendants, states should
adopt both a uniform definition of mental retardation and uniform
methods for assessment. Accordingly, state legislatures should adopt
the American Association of Mental Retardation’s (the “AAMR”)
current definition for mental retardation and require that all
assessments include the use of both a full-scale standardized
intelligence test and a measurement designed to evaluate adaptive
functioning.
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s ban on the
execution of mentally retarded defendants, as well as the problems
created by the Court’s failure to adopt a uniform standard for
determining mental retardation. Part I.A of this Comment reviews

21

Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001). In 1989, the Supreme Court had
previously considered this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). In Penry,
the Court found that there was no national consensus against executing the mentally
retarded and thus held that the practice did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 334.
22
See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
23
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21.
24
Id. at 317.
25
Id.
26
See infra PART II.
27
See infra PART II.A.
28
Id.
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the Supreme Court’s opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh, which found no
30
constitutional barriers to the execution of the mentally retarded.
Part I.B discusses the recent Supreme Court decision in Atkins v.
31
Virginia, which found that it is now “cruel and unusual punishment”
32
to execute a mentally retarded defendant.
Part II surveys the
various statutory and professional definitions of mental retardation.
Part III discusses the numerous methods for assessing mental
retardation. Specifically, Part III.A will look at various intelligence
tests, and Part III.B will examine the testing of adaptive functioning.
Part IV analyzes the problems and uncertainty created by the lack of a
uniform standard and guidelines for assessment of mental
retardation. Finally, Part V concludes that the states should adopt a
uniform definition of mental retardation and place guidelines on the
method of assessment to avoid the erroneous execution of mentally
33
retarded criminal defendants. Specifically, this part proposes that
state legislators adopt the current AAMR definition for mental
retardation and impose a statutory requirement that all evaluations
utilize both a full-scale, standardized intelligence test and a diagnostic
test designed to measure adaptive behaviors.
I. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of “cruel and unusual
34
punishments.” The Supreme Court has clearly established that this
amendment prohibits the use of punishments considered cruel and
35
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted. Based on these
criteria, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty does not
29

492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Id. at 335.
31
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
32
Id. at 321.
33
The scope of this Comment is limited to the problems associated with the
failure to identify those individuals who are mentally retarded and therefore should
not be eligible for a death sentence. The issue of faking mental retardation is an
entirely different and separate issue that will not be addressed. It should be noted
that many experts do not believe that defendants will be readily able to fake mental
retardation because most definitions require a history of limited intelligence and
problems in adaptive functions relating back to childhood. See, e.g., Emily Heller,
Faking Retardation Isn’t Likely, NAT’L L.J. (Jun. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.law.com (on file with author).
34
U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
35
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (finding that “there is now little
room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment
embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been
considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted”).
30
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constitute a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. In Gregg, the
Court noted, “the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United States
37
and in England.”
The constraints of the Eighth Amendment are not limited,
38
however, solely to those practices abhorred at common law. In Trop
39
v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren wrote that “the Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
40
the progress of a maturing society.” Under this evolving standards
of decency test, a practice is unconstitutional if it violates society’s
41
current prevailing standards of decency. This test has been refined
to require that the court make an assessment of contemporary values
42
based upon objective indicia that reflect the public opinion.
Defendants have successfully used this test to challenge the
43
imposition of the death penalty for crimes other than murder, and
44
when the defendants are mentally ill or are younger than sixteen at
45
the time the crime was committed.
Attorneys have also used the evolving standards of decency test
to challenge the imposition of a death sentence on mentally retarded
offenders. In 1989, attorneys for John Paul Penry unsuccessfully
argued that the execution of the mentally retarded violated then
46
existing standards of decency. Eleven years later the Supreme Court
47
48
granted certiorari in Atkins v. Virginia to revisit this same issue.
Recognizing a shift in public opinion as evidenced by the enactment
of many laws prohibiting a capital sentence for a mentally retarded
defendant, the Supreme Court found that contemporary values had
evolved to the point where the execution of the mentally retarded
49
would violate the Eighth Amendment.

36

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
Id. at 176.
38
Ford, 477 U.S. at 406.
39
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
40
Id. at 101.
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
43
See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 789 (1982).
44
See, e.g., Ford, 477 U.S. at 399.
45
See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
46
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989).
47
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
48
Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001).
49
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
37
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A. Penry v. Lynaugh
John Paul Penry was twenty-two years old with mild-to-moderate
50
retardation when he killed Pamela Carpenter.
On October 25,
51
1979, Penry entered Carpenter’s home intending to rape her. A
struggle ensued, and the victim superficially wounded Penry with a
52
pair of scissors. Enraged, Penry raped, beat, and stabbed the victim
53
with the scissors. Although mortally wounded, Pamela Carpenter
survived long enough to describe her assailant to the local sheriff’s
54
deputies. Based upon the victim’s description, the police suspected
55
During
Penry, a recent parolee who had served time for rape.
questioning, Penry confessed twice, and the police subsequently
56
charged him with capital murder.
Penry’s retardation originated from organic brain damage that
57
occurred during and after his breech birth. Severe abuse by his
mother, including repeated vicious blows to his head, exacerbated his
58
brain damage. He quit school during the first grade and did not
59
learn to print his name until he was thirteen. During childhood, IQ
tests placed Penry’s IQ somewhere between fifty and sixty, which
60
corresponds to mild-to-moderate retardation.
Before trial, Penry notified the court of his intention to raise an
insanity defense and filed a motion requesting a competency
61
hearing. At the competency hearing, the defense called Dr. Jerome
Brown, a clinical psychologist, to testify as to Penry’s mental
62
retardation. He testified that his evaluation revealed Penry to have

50

EMILY FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 1-2 (1993).
51

PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS

Id. at 2.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
REED, supra note 50, at 1-2.
58
Id. Penry’s mother almost died giving birth to him and suffered a nervous
breakdown from the trauma. Id. As a result, she was committed to a mental hospital
for ten months. Id. Upon her release, she returned home and began severely
abusing the child she blamed for her problems. Id. Over a ten year period, Penry
was burned with cigarettes, had his arm broken several times, was locked in his room
for long periods of time, and was forced to consume his own feces and urine. Id.
59
REED, supra note 50, at 1-2.
60
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08.
61
Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 650 (Tex. App. 1985).
62
Id.
52
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63

an IQ of fifty-four. Further, Dr. Brown stated that Penry had the
mental age of a six and a half year old and the social functioning of a
64
nine or ten year old. Nevertheless, “the jury found Penry competent
65
to stand trial.”
During the guilt phase of the trial, Penry introduced an insanity
66
defense and called Dr. Jose Garcia to testify on his behalf.
Dr.
Garcia’s testimony indicated that Penry suffered from moderate
retardation and organic brain damage that either was caused at birth
67
or was the result of severe head trauma at an early age. The doctor
testified that this made it “impossible for [Penry] to appreciate the
68
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.”
Penry’s mother testified that he was unable to learn at school, and his
69
sister testified to the abuse he suffered at the hands of his mother.
In response to Penry’s asserted insanity defense, the State
70
introduced two psychiatrists to rebut Dr. Garcia’s testimony. Dr.
Kenneth Vogtberger testified that Penry had the characteristics of
71
antisocial personality and that his low IQ scores underestimated his
72
ability to function. Dr. Felix Peebles agreed with Dr. Vogtberger’s
assessment and testified that he had diagnosed Penry with mental
73
Both of the State’s experts
retardation in both 1973 and 1977.
testified that Penry “was a person of extremely limited mental
74
ability.”
The jury rejected the insanity defense and found Penry guilty of
75
capital murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, the State
76
again called Dr. Peebles and Dr. Vogtberger to testify. This time
they asserted that should Penry ever be released he posed a high risk
63

Penry, 492 U.S. at 308.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Penry, 492 U.S. at 309.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines Antisocial
Personality Disorder as “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the
rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into
adulthood.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 706 (4th text rev. 2000). Individuals with this
disorder are commonly called psychopaths or sociopaths. Id.
72
Penry, 492 U.S. at 309.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 310.
75
Id.
76
Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d at 651.
64
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of future dangerousness and would be “a continuing threat to
77
society.” Penry’s attorneys “reoffered ‘all of the evidence heretofore
given . . . by the witnesses . . .’” and argued that the jury should
78
consider Penry’s mental retardation in assessing punishment.
79
Nevertheless, the jury sentenced Penry to death.
Penry filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
80
Court for the Eastern District of Texas challenging his sentence.
After the district court denied Penry relief, he subsequently appealed
81
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
82
circuit court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the
execution of mentally retarded offenders constitutes cruel and
83
unusual punishment.
77

Id.
Id.
79
Penry, 492 U.S. at 310. Under the Texas Penal Code at the time of Penry’s trial,
the jury decided whether or not a defendant would be sentenced to death
depending upon their answers to three questions. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03
(Vernon 1974). Under Article 37.071 (b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
the jury was asked the following questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation,
if any, by the deceased?
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981). If the jury answered all
three of the questions in the affirmative, then the trial court was required to
sentence the defendant to death. Id. at art. 37.071(c)-(e).
80
Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987); Penry, 492 U.S. at 312. In part,
Penry argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the trial
court did not instruct the jury on how they should consider mitigating circumstances
and also because the execution of the mentally retarded constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Id.
81
Penry, 492 U.S. at 312.
82
Id. Although the Court of Appeals questioned whether Penry was given the
individualized sentencing required by the Constitution, they ultimately decided that
lack of a mitigating instruction did not constitute reversible error. Id. The court also
rejected the argument that the execution of the mentally retarded qualified as cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 313.
83
Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to decide
whether Penry’s constitutional rights had been violated by the absence of a
mitigating instruction to the jury. Id. On this issue, a majority consisting of Justices
O’Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens found that the jury was not
able to adequately consider all of the mitigating evidence due to both the lack of a
mitigating instruction and the use of special issues to determine whether to impose
78
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Before the Court, Penry argued that individuals with mental
retardation are not capable of the moral culpability required to justify
84
the imposition of a death sentence. Further, he argued that there
was “an emerging national consensus against executing the mentally
85
retarded.”
A majority of the Court consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, White, Scalia, and Kennedy addressed the issue of
86
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The
Court noted that the Eighth Amendment applies to both those
punishments prohibited at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted
87
and those punishments prohibited by contemporary values. The
Court further noted that to determine the evolving standards of
decency it must look to objective evidence, including enacted
88
legislation.
The majority acknowledged a common law prohibition against
punishing “idiots” for criminal acts that has evolved into the present
89
day insanity defense. The Court found that to qualify as “idiots” at
common law, defendants would have had to show a complete lack of
90
“capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.”
The
majority, however, did not find any common law prohibition on
executing mentally retarded defendants, such as Penry, who knew
that their conduct was wrong and chose not to conform their
91
behavior to the law.
the death penalty. Id. Based on this part of the decision, Penry’s sentence was
invalidated because the Court felt that the jury did not have any way in which they
could consider Penry’s mental retardation as a potential mitigating factor. Id.
84
Id. at 328-29.
85
Id. at 329.
86
Penry, 492 U.S. at 306, 330-31. In a convoluted decision, Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and IV-A, and
the opinion of the court with respect to Parts II-A, II-B, III, and IV-B. Id. at 306. Parts
II-B and III were joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id.
Parts II-A and IV-B were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia,
and Kennedy. Id. Part IV-C is solely the opinion of Justice O’Connor. Id. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Id. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part that was joined by Justice Blackmun. Penry, 492 U.S. at 306. Justice
Scalia also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part that was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy. Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 329. The Court stated that “the clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.” Id.
89
Id. at 332.
90
Id. at 333.
91
Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
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The majority next rejected Penry’s argument that there was a
92
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded. Noting
that only two states and the federal government had statutes banning
such executions, the Court found insufficient evidence to support the
93
existence of a national consensus. The Court also rejected public
opinion polls supporting Penry’s argument, finding that they
94
provided insufficient evidence of contemporary values.
In a concurrence, Justice O’Connor stated that the courts should
consider individualized personal responsibility and not just the
presence of mental retardation when determining eligibility for the
95
death penalty. The Justice found that mental retardation should be
96
only one factor considered in determining culpability.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed
with Penry’s argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
97
execution of the mentally retarded. The Justice contended that “the
impairment of a mentally retarded offender’s reasoning abilities,
control over impulsive behavior, and moral development . . . limits
his or her culpability,” thus making the death penalty
98
disproportionate to the crime and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Further, the Justice found the execution of the mentally retarded was
also unconstitutional because it does not contribute to the penal
99
goals of deterrence and retribution.

92

Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 334. At the time of Penry, Georgia and Maryland were the only states that
had statutes banning the execution of a person who is mentally retarded. Id. The
federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also prohibited the execution of mentally
retarded offenders. Id.
The Court contrasted this situation to that in Ford v. Wainwright, where the Court
acknowledged there is a national consensus against executing mentally ill offenders,
and to Thompson v. Oklahoma, where the Court found a national consensus against
executing defendants who were younger than sixteen at the time they committed
their crimes. Id. The Court noted that at the time of Ford no states allowed the
execution of insane offenders and twenty-six states had statutes that suspended the
execution of offenders who became insane following sentencing. Penry, 492 U.S. at
334 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)). In Thompson, the
Court noted that eighteen states expressly prohibited the execution of offenders
younger than sixteen. Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 (1988)).
94
Penry, 492 U.S. at 335. The Court noted that the sentiment expressed in those
polls may ultimately be reflected in legislation and that such legislation would be a
reliable indicator of contemporary values. Id.
95
Id. at 338 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
96
Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
97
Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98
Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93
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B. Legislative Response to Penry
Following Penry, the legislative landscape underwent dramatic
100
changes. In 1989, at the time of the Penry decision, only the federal
government, Georgia, and Maryland had statutes prohibiting the
101
In the years that
execution of mentally retarded offenders.
followed, fifteen states passed legislation prohibiting the death
102
penalty for mentally disabled offenders. When one considers these
eighteen states in conjunction with the twelve states that do not have
the death penalty, more than half of the states have banned the
103
execution of a mentally retarded offender.
In April of 1990, less than a year after Penry was decided, both
Tennessee and Kentucky passed legislation to stop the executions of
104
mentally retarded offenders. Arkansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and
105
Washington soon followed.
In 1994 and 1995, Kansas and New
York, respectively, re-instated the death penalty but specifically
106
By 2001, Arizona, Connecticut,
excluded the mentally retarded.
Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota also banned the
107
execution of the mentally retarded.
Much to the surprise of death penalty opponents, in March of
2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of McCarver v.

100

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002).
See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1988)); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002). Maryland’s statute was enacted prior to Penry,
but did not take effect until one week after the decision was handed down. Penry,
492 U.S. at 334.
102
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401(2) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-1 (Michie 2002); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001);
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002).
103
Lindsay Raphael, Note and Comment, Have American Standards of Decency
Evolved to the Point Where Capital Punishment Inflicted upon the Mentally Retarded Can No
Longer Be Tolerated, 26 NOVA L. REV. 269, 299 (2001).
104
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203
(1990).
105
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §16-9-401(2)
(1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030
(1993).
106
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27
(McKinney 1995).
107
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT §
28-105.01 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2000).
101
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108

North Carolina to revisit the constitutionality of executing mentally
109
retarded criminals.
Ernest P. McCarver was convicted of firstdegree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon and sentenced
110
However, before the
to death despite having an IQ of sixty-seven.
Supreme Court could hear the McCarver case, it became moot when
the North Carolina legislature passed a new statute prohibiting the
111
execution of mentally retarded offenders. On September 25, 2001,
112
the Supreme Court dismissed McCarver, and granted certiorari to
113
address the same question in Atkins v. Virginia.
C. Atkins v. Virginia
On August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins and William Jones
kidnapped Eric Nesbitt at gunpoint, forced him to withdraw money
114
from an ATM, and then shot him eight times. Atkins was convicted
of capital murder, and the state argued for a death sentence based
115
upon future dangerousness and the “vileness of the offense.”
During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense expert, Dr.
Evan Nelson, testified that Atkins was mildly retarded with an IQ of
116
fifty-nine. Dr. Nelson based his testimony on interviews with Atkins,
his family, and jail personnel; an examination of school and court

108

533 U.S. 975 (2001).
Charles Lane, High Court to Review Executing Retarded; Decision May Reflect
Changes in State Laws on Mentally Disabled, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2001, at A1.
Opponents had been campaigning against imposing the death penalty on mentally
retarded offenders, but did not believe the Court would revisit this issue again so
soon after their 1989 ruling in Penry. Id.
110
State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 31 (N.C. 1995).
111
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2001).
112
McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001).
113
Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001).
114
Frank Green, High Court to Tackle Execution Case; Arguments to Center on Mental
Disability, THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2002, at A1; see also Frank Green,
ATM Photos Identified Atkins, Jones; Victim Played Basketball, Ran Track and was Eagle
Scout, THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2002, at A8.
The state indicted both Atkins and Jones for capital murder, however, Jones
made a deal to testify against Atkins in exchange for life imprisonment. Atkins, 536
U.S. at 308 n.1. At Atkins’ trial, both Atkins and Jones testified that it was the other
who actually shot and killed Nesbitt. Id. at 307. As one newspaper noted, when the
jury was given a choice between believing Atkins, who “bumbled on the witness
stand,” and Jones, who was smart enough not to talk to detectives and to cut a deal,
Jones was the easy choice. Sara Catania, Who Should Die, L.A. WKLY., June 28, 2002, at
20.
115
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307-08. To support these two aggravating factors, the State
offered evidence of Atkins’ prior felony convictions, testimony from earlier victims,
and pictures of Nesbitt’s body. Id. at 308.
116
Id. at 308-09.
109
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records; and the administration of a full-scale intelligence test. The
psychologist explained that Atkins’ IQ score fell into the bottom one
percent for intelligence and, in his opinion, Atkins always had limited
118
intelligence and was not currently malingering.
The State offered
119
no rebuttal.
120
The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but because of problems
with the verdict form, the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a new
121
sentencing hearing. Dr. Nelson repeated his testimony at the new
122
Dr.
hearing and this time the State offered a rebuttal witness.
Stanton Samenow testified that Atkins was not retarded, but instead
123
suffered from antisocial personality disorder.
The jury once again
124
sentenced Atkins to death.
Based upon Penry, the Virginia courts upheld Atkins’ death
125
sentence.
Because of the “dramatic shift in the state legislative
landscape,” the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
revisit the issue of the constitutionality of executing the mentally
126
retarded.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began the decision by
reviewing the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
127
punishment and the evolving standards of decency test.
The
majority concluded that, under this test, it must look at current
legislation, representing the judgment of the citizens, when deciding
128
this issue.
The majority found that the legislative landscape had
117

Id. at 309 n.4.
Id. at 309 n.5. Dr. Nelson testified that he had conducted over forty forensic
evaluations of capital defendants and Atkins was only the second defendant he had
diagnosed with mental retardation. Id. Further, based upon his evaluation, he did
not believe that the low IQ score was the result of malingering, an aberrational test
score, or the result of an invalid test. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5.
119
Id. at 309.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. Dr. Samenow’s evaluation was based upon two interviews with Atkins,
interviews with jail personnel, and a review of school records. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309
n.6. Dr. Samenow never administered an intelligence test. Id. His only testing
consisted of asking Atkins several questions from an outdated version of an IQ test.
Id. Dr. Samenow attributed Atkins’ terrible academic performance to a failure to pay
attention and a lack of motivation. Id.
124
Id. at 309.
125
Id. at 310.
126
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001).
127
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.
128
Id. at 312.
118
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129

significantly changed since Penry.
The Court noted that, based in
part on national attention from their earlier decision, sixteen states
had enacted legislation banning the execution of mentally retarded
130
offenders and other states were considering similar legislation. The
Court found significant the fact that this legislation was being
approved during a time when anticrime legislation was greatly
favored over legislation that protects people convicted of violent
131
crimes.
Further, the majority also noted that the practice of
executing mentally retarded offenders is uncommon, even in those
132
states authorizing such executions. Based upon these changes, the
Court concluded that a national consensus against executing the
133
mentally retarded had developed.
Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was disagreement
134
regarding which offenders qualify as retarded. The Court, however,
chose not to adopt a national standard for determining mental
135
retardation.
Instead, the Court preferred to ‘“leave to the States
the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
136
restriction.’”
In addition to finding that the current standards of decency do
not allow for the execution of the mentally retarded, the Court also
found that death penalty jurisprudence provides two additional
137
reasons to categorically ban the execution of the mentally retarded.
First, the Court found that these executions do not further the goals
of retribution and deterrence, and consequently result in the
138
‘“purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.’”
129

Id. at 314-15.
Id.
131
Id. at 315-16.
132
Id. at 316.
133
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. In a footnote, the Court noted that additional evidence
shows that the change in legislation “reflects a much broader social and professional
consensus.” Id. at 316 n.21. Amici Curiae Briefs submitted in this case showed that
the American Psychological Association, the American Association of Mental
Retardation, diverse religious communities, and the world community all opposed
the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Id.
134
Id. at 317.
135
Id.
136
Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
137
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19.
138
Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)). The Court
noted that previously in Gregg v. Georgia, they found that the death penalty was
justified by the social purposes of retribution and deterrence. Id. at 318-19 (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). The Court found that “the lesser
culpability of the mentally retarded offender . . . does not merit that form of
retribution.” Id. at 319. The Court also found that the diminished capacity of
130
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Second, the Court recognized that offenders with reduced capacities
139
have an increased risk of unjustifiably receiving the death penalty.
Consequently, although the Court refused to define mental
retardation, it found that once a determination of mental retardation
was made, execution would be cruel and unusual punishment under
140
the “evolving standards of decency” test.
In blistering dissents, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia criticized the majority’s finding of a national consensus against
141
executing the mentally retarded.
The dissenters accused the
majority of assessing the legislation in such a manner as to create a
142
post hoc rationalization for the decision.
Further, the dissenters
heavily criticized the majority’s use of public opinion polls, and the
opinions of professional organizations and religious groups to
143
support its analysis of contemporary social values.
Instead, the
dissenters argued that the Court’s inquiry should be limited to
144
legislation and the practices of sentencing juries. These factors, the
dissenters argued, do not provide sufficient evidence to support a
national consensus against imposing the death penalty on mentally
145
retarded offenders.
II. MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION
Although the Supreme Court banned the execution of the
mentally retarded in Atkins, it chose not to define mental
146
retardation.
Instead, the Court left it to the states to define
mentally retarded defendants makes it unlikely that the possibility of receiving the
death penalty would be understood and act as a deterrent. Id. at 319-20.
139
Id. at 320-21. Among the possibilities acknowledged by the Court are the
increased risk of false confessions, the fact that mentally retarded defendants are
unlikely to be able to assist their attorneys and make poor witnesses, and the fact that
a finding of mental retardation may enhance the likelihood of a jury believing in the
defendant’s future dangerousness. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
140
Id. at 321.
141
Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 341-45 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
142
Id. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
143
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 347 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating that “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal . . . to the views of assorted professional
and religious organizations, members of the so-called ‘world community,’ and
respondents to opinion polls”).
144
Id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 341-48 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
145
Id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 341-48 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
146
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
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147

retardation for themselves.
A survey of current state definitions
shows the problems with this approach. There is no uniformity in the
states’ current definitions of mental retardation, and consequently,
148
someone who is legally retarded in one state may not be in another.
A. Statutory Definitions
1. IQ Below Sixty-five
Statutes in both Arizona and Arkansas define mental retardation
as an IQ below sixty-five and “significant” impairment in adaptive
149
behavior.
There are, however, considerable differences between
150
these two statutes. The Arizona statute defines mental retardation
as “a condition based on a mental deficit that involves significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with significant limitations in adaptive functions” with an onset
151
before the age of eighteen.
Under this statute, courts hearing
capital cases must appoint a licensed psychologist to conduct a
152
prescreening evaluation of the defendant’s intelligence. If the prescreening evaluation finds an IQ of seventy-five or less, the defendant
is then tested by additional experts nominated by both the State and
153
the defense. A finding that the defendant has an IQ of sixty-five or
lower establishes a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is
154
retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty.
In
addition, if a defendant has an IQ of seventy or lower, he is permitted
155
to establish mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.
By comparison, Arkansas defines mental retardation as both
“significantly
subaverage
general
intellectual
functioning
accompanied by significant deficits or impairments in adaptive
functioning” that is apparent by the age of eighteen and “deficits in
156
adaptive behavior.”
There is a rebuttable presumption that those
defendants with an IQ of sixty-five or below are retarded, and
157
Under Arkansas law,
therefore ineligible for a death sentence.
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
See infra PART II.A.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2001).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2001).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(K)(2) (2001).
Id. § 13-703.02(B)(2001).
Id. § 13-703.02(D) (2001).
Id. § 13-703.02(A), (G) (2001).
Id. § 13-703.02(G) (2001).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(1) (Michie 2001).
Id. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(b) (Michie 2001).
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however, the state is not required to assess the intelligence of capital
defendants—the burden is on the defendant to prove mental
158
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. IQ Below Seventy
Several states have set seventy, rather than sixty-five, as the
159
minimum IQ for the imposition of a death sentence. However, the
level of impairment in adaptive behavior required for a
160
determination of mental retardation varies amongst these states.
Moreover, some states limit when these deficits must have become
161
apparent, while others impose no age requirement for when the
162
impairments must manifest.
Kentucky does not allow for the execution of offenders with
“significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” and “substantial
deficits in adaptive behavior,” both of which must have manifested
163
While the statute defines
during the “developmental period.”
164
significantly subaverage intelligence as an IQ of seventy or less,
there is no explanation as to what constitutes a substantial deficit, or
165
at what age the developmental period ends.
Maryland, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee all
prohibit the execution of a defendant with subaverage intellectual
functioning, as evidenced by an IQ of seventy or below on a
166
standardized intelligence test,
and by deficits in adaptive
158

Id. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2001); see also id. § 5-4-618(c) (Michie 2001).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2202(1) (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1
(Michie 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A26.1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE §
10.95.030 (2002).
160
For example, Kentucky requires “substantial deficits” in adaptive behavior,
while Nebraska and New Mexico only require the existence of deficits in adaptive
behavior. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (2001), with
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002), and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002).
161
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-202(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A27A-26.2 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001).
162
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1
(Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002).
163
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (2001). In general, the developmental
period is defined as the time between birth and adulthood. See ROBERT J. GREGORY,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 232 (3d ed. 2000). There is some variation among
definitions as to what age constitutes the end of the developmental period. See infra
PARTS II.B-D.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
An intelligence test is considered standardized when there is a uniform
159
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167

functioning.
These states also require that the mental retardation
168
manifest before a certain age.
In South Dakota, North Carolina,
and Tennessee there must be evidence that the deficits in
intelligence and adaptive functioning manifested before the age of
169
eighteen. Maryland, however, requires the manifestation of deficits
170
Consequently, if
to occur before the age of twenty-two.
hypothetical-defendant Sal’s deficits manifested at the age of
nineteen, he would be considered mentally retarded in Maryland, but
not in North Carolina, South Dakota, or Tennessee.
When other states are included in the comparison, the disparity
becomes even more apparent.
Nebraska, New Mexico, and
Washington also prohibit the execution of defendants with
subaverage intelligence and deficits in adaptive functioning as
171
evidenced by a score of seventy or less on a reliable intelligence test.
The legislators in Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington, however,
172
chose not to set an age limit for the manifestation of these deficits.
Therefore, Sal, whose deficits manifested at the age of nineteen,
would also be considered retarded in Nebraska, New Mexico, and
Washington. Further, if Sal had an IQ of sixty-five and deficits did
not manifest until the age of twenty-three, he could be executed in
Maryland, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee, but not in
Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington.
3. No Minimum IQ
In addition to those state statutes that include an IQ score as
part of their definition of mental retardation, many other states
choose not to set a minimum statutory IQ. Instead, these statutes
provide definitions that describe those deficits that qualify as mentally
See GREGORY, supra note 163, at 30-31.
method of test administration.
Standardization is important because it eliminates differences amongst different
examiners and settings. Id. Generally, standardized tests have specific directions
governing administration, including the methods of administration, timing, and the
proper responses to any questions posed by the test taker. Id.
167
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005
(2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13203 (2001).
168
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005
(2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002).
169
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005
(2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001).
170
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002).
171
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie
2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002).
172
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie
2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002).
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173

retarded for each state.
The statutory definitions range from the
standard requirement of subaverage intelligence and deficits in
174
adaptive behavior to Kansas’ definition, which requires an inability
175
to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct.
In Colorado, Georgia, and Indiana, the statutory definition of
mental retardation requires significantly subaverage intelligence that
176
exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive functioning. Colorado
requires these requirements to manifest and be documented during
177
It
the developmental period, which the statute does not define.
does, however, allow the courts to waive the documentation
requirement “upon a finding that extraordinary circumstances
178
exist.”
The Georgia statute has the same manifestation
requirements but does not require any documentation showing that
179
the deficits manifested during the developmental period.
By
comparison, Indiana requires that a court ordered evaluation finds
180
the manifestation occurred before the age of twenty-two.
The definitions of mental retardation in Connecticut, Florida,
and Missouri are similar, but their statutes provide different
181
definitions for some of the terms used to define mental retardation.
Connecticut defines subaverage intelligence as “an intelligence
quotient more than two standard deviations below the mean for the
test,” and requires that the test be a standardized intelligence test
182
administered by a person with formal training in its administration.
The Connecticut statute then defines adaptive behavior as the
“degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal
independence and social responsibility expected for the individual’s
age and cultural group,” and the developmental period as the time
173

See, e.g, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2001); MO.
REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002).
174
See, e.g, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002).
175
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2001).
176
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002).
177
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002).
178
Id.
179
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002).
180
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002).
181
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); MO.
REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001).
182
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001).
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183

from birth to eighteen years of age.
Florida’s statute is almost
identical, but does not specify who may administer the test to a
184
defendant.
Missouri does not specify what qualifies as subaverage
intellectual functioning, but requires “limitations in two or more
adaptive behaviors” defined as “communication, self-care, home
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety,
functional academics, leisure and work” that manifest before the age
185
of eighteen.
The definition of mental retardation in the Kansas statute is
186
quite different from all others.
Kansas defines mental retardation
as subaverage intelligence “to an extent which substantially impairs
one’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to
187
conform one’s conduct to the requirements of law.” Therefore, in
Kansas, unlike all other states, a mentally retarded offender can be
executed unless, as the result of his mental deficiencies, he cannot
understand the criminality of his behavior or conform his behavior to
188
the law.
B. The American Association on Mental Retardation’s Definition
In addition to the various state statutory definitions of mental
retardation, several professional organizations also define mental
retardation. The American Association on Mental Retardation (the
“AAMR”) is an interdisciplinary organization of professionals that
189
focuses on mental retardation.
Founded in 1876, the AAMR has
190
defined mental retardation since 1921.
The AAMR continually
183

Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002).
185
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001).
186
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2001).
187
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2001).
188
Id.
189
American Association of Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation,
available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_mental_retardation.shtml (last visited
Oct. 5, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter AAMR 2002].
190
Id. Originally, the organization was entitled “The Association of Medical
Officers of American Institutions of Idiotic and Feeble-minded Children.” James W.
Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 414, 421 n.39 (1985). In 1906, the name of the association was changed to “The
American Association for the Study of the Feeble-minded,” and in 1933 the name
“The American Association on Mental Deficiency” was adopted. Id. By 1992, the
organization was known by its present name. See generally James W. Ellis, MENTAL
RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A GUIDE TO STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 6,
available at www.aamr.org/Reading_Room/pdf/state_legislatures_guide.pdf (citing
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 9th ed. 1992)) (last
184
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revises its definition, and published its latest comprehensive update
191
in 2002.
Currently, the AAMR defines mental retardation as “a disability
characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual
functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual,
social, and practical adaptive skills,” which manifests before the age of
192
eighteen.
When determining mental retardation, professionals
must abide by the following guidelines:
1. Evaluate limitations in present functioning within the context
of the individual’s age peers and culture;
2. Take into account the individual’s cultural and linguistic
differences as well as communication, sensory, motor, and
behavioral factors;
3. Recognize that within an individual limitations often coexist
with strengths;
4. Describe limitations so that an individualized plan of needed
supports can be developed; and
5. Provide appropriate personalized supports to improve the
193
functioning of a person with mental retardation.

The AAMR’s intelligence criterion for diagnosing mental retardation
194
is an IQ score of approximately seventy or below.
Based on the
standard of error that exists for most intelligence tests, however, the
AAMR makes an IQ of seventy-five the cutoff for a diagnosis of
195
mental retardation.
visited Mar. 27, 2003) (on file with author).
191
AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
In 1983, the AAMR definition of mental retardation was “significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in
adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.” AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11
(Herbert J. Grossman ed., 8th ed. 1983) [hereinafter AAMR 1983].
In 1992, the AAMR defined mental retardation as:
substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics,
leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 9th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter AAMR 1992].
192
AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
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Adaptive behavior is defined by the AAMR as “the collection of
conceptual, social, and practical skills,” which allow people to
196
function in their everyday lives.
The AAMR recommends that
limitations in adaptive behavior be assessed by using standardized
testing, and defines significant limitations as a score that is two or
more standard deviations below the average either on a conceptual,
197
social, or practical sub-test, or on the overall test.
The focus of the AAMR definition is on evaluating mental
198
retardation in order to develop an individualized support plan.
Supports are the “resources and individual strategies necessary to
promote the development, education, interests, and personal well199
being” of those with mental retardation.
The AAMR definition is
based on a premise that the assessment is designed to allow the
professional to consider the individual’s limitations in order to create
200
and implement an appropriate treatment plan. The definition was
not created for classification purposes, but rather is part of a model
meant to help each mentally disabled individual function to the best
201
of his or her ability.
C. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Definition
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the
“DSM-IV-TR”) is a uniform and standardized system for the
202
classification and diagnosis of mental disorders.
The DSM-IV-TR,
published by the American Psychiatric Association, is the definitive
203
diagnostic tool for psychologists and psychiatrists. Its classifications
are based on a systematic, empirical study of literature reviews, data
204
The diagnostic criteria, categories, and
analysis, and field trials.

196

Id.
Id.
198
AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
199
Id.
Support areas include providing activities focusing on “human
development, teaching and education, home living, community living, employment,
health and safety, behavior, sociability, and protection and advocacy.” Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS xviii-xxvi (4th text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
203
ROBERT C. CARSON ET AL., ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 8-9 (10th
ed. 1998). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is the “gold
standard” for defining mental disorder. Id.; see also GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M.
NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 59 (6th ed. 1994) (referring to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as the “current, official diagnostic system
widely employed by mental health professionals”).
204
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at xxvi-xxx.
197
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descriptions are meant to be used for classification by those
individuals with appropriate clinical training and diagnostic
205
experience.
206
the DSM-IV-TR
Based upon the 1992 AAMR definition,
diagnostic criteria for mental retardation are:
A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of
approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ
test . . . .
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive
functioning, . . . in at least two of the following areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills,
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.
207

C. The onset is before age 18 years.

The DSM-IV-TR advises that, based upon the measurement error
inherent in all testing instruments, an individual whose IQ is between
seventy and seventy-five would still qualify as mentally retarded if he
208
or she also exhibited significant deficits in adaptive behavior.
Conversely, regardless of a low IQ score, mental retardation should
not be diagnosed in individuals without deficits in adaptive
209
behavior.
The DSM-IV-TR defines adaptive functioning as the effectiveness
with which an individual can cope with the demands of everyday life
and how he compares to the standards of personal independence
expected in someone of a comparable age, socio-cultural
210
background, and community.
The Manual calls for evidence of
adaptive functioning to be gathered from reliable independent
211
Further, the DSM-IV-TR recommends the administration
sources.
of one of the available commercial tests used to assess an individual’s
212
adaptive functioning.
D. American Psychological Association’s Definition
The American Psychological Association (the “APA”) defines

205

Id. at xxiv-xxvii.
See sources cited supra note 191.
207
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49.
208
Id. at 41-42.
209
Id. at 42.
210
Id.
211
Id. Examples of reliable independent sources include teacher evaluations, and
school and medical histories. Id.
212
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 42.
206
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mental retardation as “(a) significant limitations in general
intellectual functioning; (b) significant limitations in adaptive
functioning which exist concurrently; and (c) onset of intellectual
213
and adaptive limitations before the age of 22 years.” The APA notes
that this definition is essentially analogous with the current DSM-IV214
TR definition and with an earlier AAMR definition.
The APA definition instructs that “significant limitations in
intellectual functioning” should be determined based upon a score
that is two or more standard deviations below the mean on a valid
and “comprehensive, individual measure of intelligence that is
administered in a standardized format and interpreted by a qualified
215
practitioner.”
Similarly, “significant limitations in adaptive
functioning” should be determined through the use of “a valid and
216
comprehensive, individual measure of adaptive behavior.”
A
diagnosis of mental retardation requires that these limitations
217
originate before the age of twenty-two.
The APA stresses that all
three of these criteria must be met before an individual can be
218
diagnosed with mental retardation.
III. METHODS OF ASSESSING MENTAL RETARDATION
Mental retardation assessments generally are conducted by
trained individuals, including psychiatrists, psychologists, and social
workers, and involve both the use of appropriate psychological tests
219
and in-depth clinical evaluations. The majority of these assessments
are conducted on children for identification and evaluation of
220
mental retardation. In death penalty cases, however, the evaluation
of adult criminal defendants is conducted for use in the legal
221
system.
213

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (John W. Jacobson & James A.
Mulick eds., 1996) [hereinafter APA].
214
Id. at 2.
215
Id. at 13.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 14.
219
See APA, supra note 213, at 113.
220
See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at xviii-xxvi (categorizing mental
retardation as a “Disorder Usually First Diagnosed in Infancy, Childhood, or
Adolescence”); JEROME SATTLER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN 651 (3d ed. 1992)
(discussing the importance of evaluating mentally retarded children so that
appropriate remedial action can be taken).
221
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308-09 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 307-09 (1989).

798

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:773

In general, psychological testing consists of following a
222
standardized procedure to sample and categorize behavior.
Although the formats of these tests vary widely, most use standardized
testing procedures and defined scoring methods and, generally,
results are determined by comparing the test taker’s scores against
223
Most psychological tests are released
existing norms or standards.
only to qualified persons because an erroneous score from an
unqualified examiner can cause harm, the previewing of test
questions renders the test invalid, and the leaking of the test’s
224
content to the general public would destroy the test’s effectiveness.
A. Intelligence Testing
Historically, individual intelligence tests measured a broad range
225
of skills in order to estimate a person’s general intelligence.
Modern intelligence tests have continued to assess intelligence by
226
Most modern intelligence tests
testing a wide variety of skills.
consist of numerous subtests from which the subject’s overall
227
intelligence score is ultimately derived.
The most common fullscale, standardized intelligence tests used to assess individual adult
intelligence levels are the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-III and
228
the Stanford-Binet: Fourth Edition.
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (the “WAIS-III”) is one
229
of the most widely used individualized intelligence tests.
The test
uses fourteen subtests to assess Full-Scale, Verbal, and Performance
230
Intelligence.
Scores on the individual subtests are converted into
222

GREGORY, supra note 163, at 30-32.
Id.
224
Id. at 39-40.
225
Id. at 30-32.
226
Id. at 34.
227
Id.
228
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 177.
229
ROGER PIERANGELO & GEORGE GIULIANI, SPECIAL EDUCATOR’S COMPLETE GUIDE
TO 109 DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 32 (1998).
230
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 187. Full Scale IQ is an individual’s overall score
on the WAIS-III. See id. Although there are fourteen subtests, object assembly has
become optional and is only used if necessary to replace another subtest. Id. at 187.
Of the thirteen main subtests, eleven must be completed in order to compute the
subject’s Full Scale IQ. Id.
Verbal IQ analyzes “auditory input and vocal output.” PIERANGELO & GIULIANI,
supra note 229, at 32. The subtests for computation of Verbal IQ are Vocabulary,
Similarities, Arithmetic, Digit Span, Information, and Comprehension. Id. at 32-33.
These subtests measure numerous abilities including attention, concentration,
learning ability, reasoning skills, and memory. Id.
Performance IQ refers to an individual’s ability to perform tasks that measure
223
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scaled scores, averaged, and then converted into an IQ score. The
subject’s IQ score is normed based upon a mean IQ score of one
232
hundred with a standard deviation of fifteen points. Representing
only 2.2% of the population, an individual whose IQ score is below
233
seventy is considered Intellectually Deficient.
The WAIS-III was standardized on a large sample of adults
carefully stratified to match the population figures from the 1995
234
235
The test has exceptional reliability and
United States Census.
236
Other strengths of the WAIS-III are that its scores highly
validity.
correlate with academic achievement and the test is “well organized
237
and easy to use.” Some experts, however, have criticized the WAISIII, arguing that some questions have a cultural bias and, below an IQ
of forty, the test does not provide distinguishable levels of
238
retardation.
In constrast, the Stanford-Binet: Fourth Edition (the “SB:FE”) is
“visual input and vocal or motoric output.” Id. at 32. The Performance IQ subtests
are Picture Completion, Digit Symbol-Coding, Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, and
Picture Arrangement. Id. at 33. Some of the abilities measured by these subtests are
visual perception, visual discrimination, attention to detail, and speed in learning
tasks. Id.
231
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 109.
232
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 187-88. IQ scores obtained on the WAIS-III are
classified as follows:
IQ Range
Classification
Percent Included
130 and over
Very Superior
2.2
120-129
Superior
6.7
110-119
High Average
16.1
90-109
Average
50.0
80-89
Low Average
16.1
70-79
Borderline
6.7
69 and below
Intellectually Deficient
2.2
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 109.
233
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 34. The WAIS-III category of
Intellectually Deficient refers to anyone scoring below a score of seventy on the test.
Id. An individual scoring in that category has “significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning.” See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 41.
234
GREGORY, supra note 222, at 188. The sample, consisting of 2,450 adults, was
carefully stratified on the variables of race, sex, education, and geographic region.
Id.
235
Id. at 189; see also PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 47. Reliability is a
measure of the test’s consistency measured by the ability to replicate results. Id. at
75.
236
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 189-90; see also PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note
229, at 47. Validity is the extent to which a test measures what it purports to measure.
Id. at 96.
237
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 47.
238
Id. at 48.
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based upon a hierarchical model of intelligence that is tested
239
through the use of various subtests. The SB:FE contains fifteen
subtests, which measure Verbal Reasoning, Quantitative Reasoning,
240
The
Abstract/Visual Reasoning, and Short Term Memory.
examiner totals the scores in these four areas and converts them to a
241
composite IQ score.
The examiner then compares the composite
IQ score against a mean of one hundred with a standard deviation of
242
sixteen. The SB:FE classifies a subject with an IQ of sixty-seven or
243
below as mentally retarded.
The developers of the SB:FE standardized the test on a sample of
over five thousand subjects selected to be representative of the
244
population in the 1980 United States Census.
The test is
representative of the target population and, for the most part, has a
245
high reliability.
While the SB:FE is a valid test of intellectual
246
247
These include the lack of
ability, it has several weaknesses.
uniformity in composite scores among age groups and the fact that
the SB:FE suggests time limits but does not require that they be
248
enforced. Additionally, to lower testing time, the SB:FE allows the
examiner to administer shortened versions of the individual subtests
249
and this may result in a reduction of the test’s reliability.
Also
problematic is the fact that SB:FE composite IQ scores have been
found to be higher than the comparative WAIS-III IQ scores by an
250
average of seven points.
239

GREGORY, supra note 163, at 193.
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 52-53. The Verbal Reasoning
Subtests are Vocabulary, Comprehension, Absurdities, and Verbal Relations. Id.
Quantative Reasoning is tested through the Quantitative, Number Series, and
Equation Building Subtests. Id. The Abstract/Visual Reasoning Subtests are Pattern
Analysis, Copying, Matrices, and Paper Folding and Cutting. Id. Finally, the subtests
of Bead Memory, Memory for Sentences, Memory for Digits, and Memory for Objects
test Short-Term Memory. Id.
241
Id. at 53.
242
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 53.
243
Id.
244
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 194. The sample was chosen to represent the same
“geographic region, community size, ethnic group, age, and sex” as the census
population. Id.
245
Id. at 196. The reliability of the Memory for Objects subtest is only fair, but the
composite score reliability is exceptional. Id.
246
Id. at 197.
247
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 54.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 198. This means that, on average, an individual
with a WAIS-III IQ score of 100 will be assessed at an IQ of 107 on the SB:FE. Id.
This can be problematic because it can lead to very different diagnostic impressions.
240
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B. Testing Adaptive Functioning
An assessment of adaptive behavior is an evaluation of how well
individuals “meet the standards of personal independence and social
251
responsibility” expected for their age and cultural background.
Diagnostic assessment instruments that measure functional ability in
many areas—including communication, self-care, and social skills—
252
are used to evaluate adaptive behavior. The subject, or a third party
who is familiar with the subject, provides the information needed to
253
make the assessment. The AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale and the
Camelot Behavioral Checklist are both well-known measures of
254
adaptive behavior.
The AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale (the “ABS-RC:2”) was
designed to measure “an individual’s strengths and weaknesses
255
among adaptive domains and factors.”
The norm-referenced test
256
relies on many different factors to provide a percentile score.
Described as “a psychometric tour de force that borders on overkill,”
257
the ABS-RC:2 is both reliable and valid.
The test is an excellent
258
measure of an individual’s adaptive behavior levels.
The Camelot Behavioral Checklist also evaluates the adaptive
259
behavior in adults.
The test consists of almost four hundred
260
behavior descriptions grouped into domains and subdomains. The
domain scores are converted to norm-referenced percentiles that
261
indicate the individual’s level of functioning. The test has excellent

Id. It is unclear whether this is the result of the SB:FE intelligence score being too
high or the WISC-III intelligence score being too low. Id.
251
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 195.
252
Id. An examiner should focus on “communication, community use, selfdirection, health and safety, functional academics, self-care, home living, social skills,
leisure, and work.” Id.
253
Id. The required information can be obtained from a parent, former teachers,
direct service providers, or correctional facility employees. Id.
254
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 236-37. Although there are many instruments that
test adaptive behavior, these two are appropriate for both adult populations and for
diagnosis purposes. Id. Other scales can only be used on children or for remedial
purposes. Id.
255
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 196.
256
Id. The test was normed on a sample of over 4,000 developmentally disabled
individuals from forty-three states. GREGORY, supra note 163, at 236.
257
GREGORY, supra note 163, at 236.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 237.
260
Id. The behavior descriptions include items such as ‘“pours liquids,’ ‘waxes
floors,’ ‘can boil food,’ and ‘can do stapling jobs.’” Id.
261
Id. The instrument was normed on a sample of 624 developmentally disabled
individuals. GREGORY, supra note 163, at 237.
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reliability and its scores highly correlate with IQ scores obtained on
262
the WISC-III and the SB:FE.
IV. ANALYSIS
While the Supreme Court has found the execution of the
mentally retarded to be unconstitutional, the Court’s decision not to
set a standard for mental retardation is problematic. The wide
disparity in the current state definitions of mental retardation already
results in “significant differences as to exactly who it is that is
263
included under the protective umbrella of prohibition.”
Further,
the absence of uniform testing requirements often results in
opposing expert witnesses using drastically different testing methods
264
to come to contradictory conclusions.
Even a cursory examination of current statutory definitions
reveals the necessity of implementing a uniform statutory definition
265
and mandatory assessment guidelines.
To that end, the AAMR
definition is best suited for determining mental retardation in
266
criminal populations.
Moreover, because the field of psychology
accepts these testing methods for determining intelligence and
267
adaptive functioning, state legislators should also accept them.
Statutes should require that intelligence be assessed using either the
WAIS-III or the SB:FE, and that adaptive functioning be measured
through the use of the AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale or the
268
Camelot Behavioral Checklist.
A. The Absence of a Uniform Definition of Mental Retardation
The circumstances surrounding the crimes committed by Son H.
269
Fleming and Horace F. Dunkins are similar.
Both defendants
“committed notoriously brutal crimes and were classified as ‘mildly
270
retarded,’ possessing IQs just below seventy.”
Both were black
262

Id.
Respondent’s Brief at 40, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452).
264
See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
265
See supra PART II.A.
266
See infra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
267
See supra PART III.
268
Id.
269
Charles-Edward Anderson, Low-IQ Murderers: States seek executions of mentally
retarded convicts, 75 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (1989).
270
Id. Horrace Dunkins was convicted for the rape, torture, and murder of a
young mother of four. REED, supra note 50, at 88. The victim was murdered outside
of her home where her children were sleeping. Id. She was stabbed sixty-six times
and left tied to a tree where her husband found her when he returned from work in
263
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defendants convicted of capital murder by juries who were
271
uninformed of their mental retardation.
More importantly,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Penry, Fleming and
Dunkins were the first mentally retarded offenders scheduled for
272
execution. Fleming lived because he was on death row in Georgia,
while Dunkins died because he had the misfortune of committing his
273
crime in Alabama.
While this example occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s ban
on the execution of the mentally retarded, today it would still be
possible for Alabama to execute Dunkins regardless of Georgia’s
treatment of a similarly situated offender. If Alabama adopts a
mental retardation statute requiring an IQ of sixty-five or less, as is
the standard in both Arizona and Arkansas, then Dunkins would still
274
be eligible for the death penalty today.
If Arizona sets the
minimum IQ at seventy, like Nebraska and New Mexico, then
275
Dunkins would live.
Moreover, Alabama could adopt the same
276
If, like Georgia’s
statute as Georgia, and still execute Dunkins.
statute, the new Alabama statute does not set a minimum IQ then the
issue of Dunkins’ mental retardation would rest on whether or not
the Alabama court believed him to be retarded—the Georgia courts’
treatment of a virtually identical prisoner would not carry any

the morning. Id. at 89. Dunkins, who never finished high school, was functionally
illiterate and had the mental status of a ten-to-twelve-year old. Id.
Son H. Fleming was sentenced to death for the murder of a small town police
chief. Peter Applebome, 2 States Grapple with Issues of Executing Retarded Men, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1989, at A12. The police chief had stopped a car driven by Fleming,
unaware that Fleming and two accomplices had just committed a robbery. Id. They
murdered the police chief and dumped his body in a swamp. Id. Approximately
eleven years prior to the murder, Fleming, who had never learned to read or write,
had received a shotgun blast to his face causing him to lose almost all of his mental
capacities. REED, supra note 50, at 128.
271
Applebome, supra note 270, at A12.
272
Id.
273
REED, supra note 50, at 88-89. Fleming had his death sentence vacated
because, unlike Alabama, Georgia law did not allow for the execution of mentally
retarded offenders. Id.
Dunkins’ execution received national attention because the electric chair failed
to kill him on the first attempt. Peter Applebome, 2 Electric Jolts in Alabama Execution,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1989, at 1. Blaming human error for the failure, the state
reported that the switch had to be thrown a second time before Dunkins could be
declared dead. Id.
274
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie
2001).
275
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie
2002).
276
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002).
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277

weight.
Similarly, the fate of Eddie Mitchell, a death row inmate in
Louisiana, depends on how the Louisiana legislature or courts define
278
mental retardation.
Following an unsuccessful attempt to borrow
money from his victim, Mitchell killed the man when he struck him
279
in the head with a stick. When questioned by the police, Mitchell
280
waived his right to counsel and confessed to the crime. Ultimately,
281
a jury sentenced him to death.
282
As a child, he had to
Eddie Mitchell has an IQ of sixty-six.
repeat several grades, and his classmates mocked him for his
283
stupidity. When he dropped out of school, he was eighteen and in
284
the eighth grade. Mitchell’s intellectual capacities are so impaired
that he was unable to learn how to play baseball and his Cub Scout
master reports, “on the rare occasions when he actually caught the
ball, ‘he would just hold on to it, maybe kiss it, but never throw it
285
on.’” Mitchell’s fate is in the hands of the Louisiana legislature and
courts, and turns on how they choose to define mental retardation.
If Louisiana chooses to set the minimum IQ for mental retardation at
sixty-five, Mitchell will still be executed. A minimum IQ of seventy,
however, means that Mitchell will live.
These cases illustrate the problem with the absence of a uniform
definition for mental retardation. The AAMR, DSM-IV-TR, and APA
definitions all provide a similar standard for the assessment of mental
286
retardation.
Consequently, the decision as to which definition to
adopt is really a matter of which is the most suitable for codification
and application in a criminal law context.
The APA definition is substantially similar to the DSM-IV-TR

277

See id.
Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental
Retardation § VII, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-07.htm
(March 20, 2001) (on file with author).
279
Louisiana v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 253 (La. 1996).
280
Id. It has been reported that Mitchell believed that waiving his rights meant to
wave his right hand. Human Rights Watch, supra note 278.
281
Mitchell, 674 So. 2d at 252.
282
Human Rights Watch, supra note 278.
283
Id. Mitchell had to repeat the first grade twice and the sixth grade three times.
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id. In part of a statement provided to his attorneys, in large childish letters,
Mitchell wrote, “I love to shop in the store. I like ice cream very. Smile. I like horse.
I like food to eat. Yes I like cat, and dog.” Id.
286
See supra PART II.B–D.
278
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definition with the exception of the required age of onset.
The
APA specifies that the mental disability must have manifested prior to
age twenty-two, while the DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR require the
288
presence of symptoms before the age of eighteen. The purpose of
this age requirement is to ensure that the mental retardation
developed during the developmental period, as opposed to forms of
289
brain damage that occur later in life.
In a criminal law setting, the age requirement serves the added
purpose of “ensur[ing] that defendants may not feign mental
290
retardation once charged with a capital offense.”
Under this
standard, faking cognitive impairment following an arrest would not
be sufficient for a diagnosis because the offender’s symptoms would
291
need to have been observed prior to the specified age. Given that
malingering is a concern whenever you are dealing with a criminal
population, both the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions are
better suited to this population than the APA definition with its
292
higher age limit.
The AAMR is “the principal professional organization in the
293
field of mental retardation.”
The AAMR’s definition of mental
294
295
retardation has influenced courts, legislatures, and the DSM-IV

287

Compare APA, supra note 213, at 113, with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49.
Compare APA, supra note 213, at 113, with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49, and
AAMR 2002, supra note 189. The requirement that symptoms be present should not
to be mistaken for a requirement that the individual be diagnosed before the age of
eighteen. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note202, at 42; see also AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
The DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR definitions do not require a diagnosis before the
individual reaches the age of majority. Id. Instead, they require that the individual
exhibited signs and symptoms supported by evidence such as a review of school
records, interviews with the subject and others, a review of medical records, and any
other available evidence concerning the subject’s mental abilities before the age of
eighteen. Id.
289
James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues 9, available at http://www.aamr.org/Reading_Room/pdf/state_
legislatures_guide.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2003) (on file with author). While brain
injuries occurring later in life can impair cognitive functions, the impairments
caused by such injuries do not fall within the definition of mental retardation. Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 190, at 421.
294
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985); see
also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
309 n.3 (2002).
295
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130
(Michie 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A26.1 (Michie 2000).
288
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296

definition. As the AAMR’s definition has changed, similar changes
297
298
appeared in both newly drafted statutes, and the DSM definitions.
In all likelihood, the next version of the DSM will once again mirror
299
the current AAMR definition of mental retardation.
Additionally, the current AAMR definition is more appropriate
for the evaluation of mental retardation in criminal defendants than
the DSM-IV-TR definition. The DSM-IV-TR definition describes the
adaptive behavior component as “concurrent deficits or impairments
in present adaptive functioning . . . in at least two of the following
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
300
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.”
The purpose of this
conceptualization of adaptive behavior is to determine “how
effectively individuals cope with common life demands,” so as to
301
establish the individual’s needs for services and supports.
The AAMR definition is also concerned with the identification of
mental retardation in order to develop personalized plans with
302
individualized supports.
Still, the wording of the current AAMR
definition is better suited for evaluations of defendants facing the
303
The AAMR definition now requires that deficits
death penalty.
manifest “in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and
304
practical adaptive skills.” This definition requires that the disability
“be manifested in real-world disability in the individual’s life” and
296

See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 36 (3d 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]; DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 202, at 49.
297
Compare AAMR 1983, supra note 191, at 11, and AAMR 1992, supra note 191, at
3, with GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie
1990), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2001), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1
(Michie 2000).
298
Compare AAMR 1983, supra note 191, at 11, and AAMR 1992, supra note 191, at
3, with DSM-III, supra note 296, at 36, and DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49. The
DSM has consistently revised its definition as the AAMR definition has been revised.
Compare AAMR 1983, supra note 191, at 11, and AAMR 1992, supra note 191, at 3, with
DSM-III, supra note 296, at 36, and DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49.
299
Compare AAMR 1983, supra note 191, at 11, and AAMR 1992, supra note 191, at
3, with DSM-III, supra note 296, at 36, and DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49. The
latest revision of the DSM containing its present definition of mental retardation
occurred in 2000, prior to the 2002 AAMR revision. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at
xxix. The next full revision of the DSM is not expected for several years, but it
follows that the DSM-V will most likely adopt the current AAMR definition. Id.
300
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49.
301
Id. at 42.
302
AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
303
Ellis, supra note 289, at 8.
304
AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
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“focuses on broad categories of adaptive impairment,” rather than
305
“service related skill areas.”
It is the presence of a “real-world
disability” and not the formulation of a treatment plan that is of
306
importance to the judicial system.
The DSM-IV-TR definition exists as part of a uniform and
standardized system utilized by practitioners to classify and diagnose
307
mental retardation.
Consequently, the DSM-IV-TR definition
provides a clear systematic approach for diagnosing mental
308
Conversely, the AAMR created its definition to help
retardation.
identify those with mental retardation in order to develop a personal
309
plan with individualized supports.
Nonetheless, in light of the
current AAMR definition’s better applicability in the criminal
context, as well as the trend among prior legislatures in codifying
AAMR definitions, the current AAMR definition provides the best
standard for assessing the mental retardation of offenders facing a
possible death sentence.
B. The Lack of Uniform Testing Requirements
Due in part to variable methods of assessing mental retardation
prosecution and defense witnesses often come to opposing
conclusions regarding a defendant’s mental capacity. In Atkins, the
defense expert, Dr. Evan Nelson, concluded that Atkins was mentally
retarded following test results from a full-scale WAIS-III intelligence
test; interviews with Atkins, his family, and correctional officers; and a
310
review of school records, court records, and police reports.
Dr.
Nelson validated Atkins’ low IQ score by looking at both “tell tales
within the test that would reveal ‘faking,’” and independent
information that confirmed Atkins’ life long low level of
311
functioning.
In comparison, the expert for the prosecution
concluded that Atkins was of average intelligence without
312
administering an intelligence test.
Dr. Stanton Samenow simply
305

Ellis, supra note 289, at 8.
Id.
307
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at xxiv-xxvi.
308
Id. at 49. The 1992 AAMR definition upon which the DSM-IV-TR definition is
based specifies that the purpose of this definition of adaptive behavior is to aid
clinicians in determining the level of support and services required by the individual.
AAMR 1992, supra note 191, at 15-16.
309
See supra PART II.B. The AAMR definition describes the concept of supports as
a method of evaluating the needs of an individual and then adopting strategies,
services, and supports that will address those needs. AAMR 2002, supra note 189.
310
Petitioner’s Brief at 9-10, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452).
311
Id.
312
Id. at 17-19.
306
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asked Atkins a few questions taken from an outdated intelligence test,
313
reviewed his school records, and interviewed the correctional staff.
When confronted about his use of an outdated test, “Dr. Samenow
314
replied that he was not ‘doing a full evaluation with testing.’” It is
egregious that the State’s witness did not utilize any of the various
appropriate intelligence tests before providing such crucial and
important testimony.
Although best illustrated by Atkins, this discrepancy also existed
during the cases of both Oliver Cruz and Ernest McCarver. When the
315
state of Texas executed Oliver Cruz on Aug 9, 2000, defense experts
classified Cruz as retarded based upon his IQ of sixty-four and his
316
history of difficulties. Conversely, the state acknowledged that Cruz
317
was not “very smart,” but prosecutors refused to acknowledge his
retardation because he had once scored in the low average range on
318
Lawyers for Ernest McCarver argue that
an intelligence test.
repeated scores on intelligence tests showed mental retardation,
while the prosecution disputes that finding based in part on the
319
assertion that McCarver carefully planned a murder.
The American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct (the “APA Ethics Code”) provides
320
standards of professional conduct for psychologists.
Although the
APA Ethics Code was written specifically for APA members, the code
is often applied by state boards and courts to others practicing in the
321
field of psychology.
The APA Ethics Code clearly states that
psychologists who perform evaluations for the courts must base their
assessments “on information . . . sufficient to provide appropriate
322
substantiation for their findings.”
Further, psychologists may not
313

Id.
Id.
Dr. Samenow was confronted with the American Psychological
Association’s ethical standards, which prohibit testing using outdated tests. Id.
315
Human Rights Watch, supra note 278. The State of Texas executed Oliver
Cruz for the brutal rape and murder of a twenty-four year-old woman. Id.
316
Raymond Bonner & Sara Rimmer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even as Laws
Begin to Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at A1.
317
Id.
318
Alicia Montgomery, Too Slow for Death Row?, SALON.COM (Aug. 9, 2000),
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All.
319
Anne Saker, Execution Dates Set for Three Murderers, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER,
Oct. 13, 2001, at A3. McCarver was sentenced to death for the 1987 stabbing of a
fellow cafeteria worker. Id.
320
American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct, in ETHICAL CONFLICTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 6 (Donald N. Bersoff ed., 1995)
[hereinafter APA Ethics Code].
321
Id.
322
Id. at 22.
314
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base their evaluations on tests and measures that are outdated and,
323
therefore, obsolete.
The APA has also created the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic
324
Psychologists (the “Specialty Guidelines”).
The Specialty
Guidelines are an aspirational model for psychologists acting as
325
They provide that forensic
experts for the judicial system.
psychologists have an obligation to know and use current and
326
acceptable standards of evaluation.
Moreover, the Specialty
Guidelines require that forensic psychologists must “make every
reasonable effort” to conduct an adequate examination and should
avoid providing testimony “about the psychological characteristics of
particular individuals when they have not had an opportunity to
conduct an examination of the individual adequate to the scope of
327
the statements, opinions, or conclusions . . . .”
Under these guidelines, the evaluation performed by Dr.
Samenow was wholly inadequate to support his conclusions and
blatantly unethical. The APA Ethics Code and the Specialty
Guidelines require that psychologists, who assess mental retardation
for the courts, do a thorough evaluation that includes the use of all
328
available up-to-date testing methods.
The diagnosis of mental
retardation “cannot be accomplished by casual examination or
329
impressionistic observations.” A competent evaluation must involve
both the skilled administration of a standardized intelligence test and
330
a thorough assessment of adaptive behavior.
Legislators should
require the application of these standards to all expert testimony
regarding whether or not a death eligible defendant is mentally
retarded.
There are valid and reliable psychological tests for determining

323

Id. at 13.
Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines
for Forensic Psychologists, in ETHICAL CONFLICTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 441 (Donald N. Bersoff
ed., 1995) [hereinafter Specialty Guidelines].
325
Id. The Specialty Guidelines were created by the American Psychology-Law
Division and Division 41 of the American Psychological Society and have been
endorsed by the American Academy of Forensic Science. Id. The Guidelines have
not been formally adopted by the APA and therefore are only an aspirational model
for professional conduct. Id.
326
Id. at 445.
327
Id. at 447.
328
APA Ethics Code, supra note 320, at 22; see also Specialty Guidelines, supra note
324, at 445.
329
Ellis, supra note 289, at 11.
330
Id.
324
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331

both intelligence and adaptive functioning. Both the WAIS-III and
the SB:FE are extremely reliable individual intelligence tests, and the
AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale and the Camelot Behavioral Checklist
332
are validated measures of adaptive behavior.
Evaluations of a
defendant’s mental capacity determines whether he or she will live or
die, and as such, state statutes should require that expert witnesses
utilize appropriate methods of testing.
CONCLUSION
Currently, states use several different definitions of and accepted
procedures for testing and assessing mental retardation. This lack of
uniformity is problematic because, as a practical matter, whether or
333
not an individual is retarded will depend upon which state he is in.
Therefore, even though the Supreme Court has banned the
execution of the mentally retarded, someone who is not death
eligible in one state because of mental retardation can still be
executed in another state. This will result in the arbitrary imposition
334
of the death penalty.
Consequently, to avoid this problem, state legislatures should all
adopt the current AAMR definition as the standard for determining
mental retardation. Further, they should require that the evaluation
be done by an expert who bases his assessment on both a full-scale,
standardized individual intelligence test and a diagnostic assessment
instrument for adaptive behaviors.
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See supra PART III.
See supra PART III.A.
333
See supra PART IV.
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In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court declared that any systems for
imposing the death penalty that are arbitrary and capricious are unconstitutional.
408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
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